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STATEMENT CF THE CASE
A.

1

NATURE OF THE CASE
GMAC file April 24, 2009 a four (4) paoe complaint,(OT 1.::-n

each of the first four pages, numbered "Page 4",

oo

which were

attached two (2) unmarked exhbits, the first a one sheet document
with the top printed "POP ELECTRONIC TITLE DOCUMENTS~' and the
second (CT 6-7) a reduced in size copy of a purported elongated
printea form entitled: RETAIL INSTALMENT SALE CONTRACT, GMAC
FLEXIBLE FINANCE PLAN, for buyer CINDY LEE BACH, 10 North 27TH ST,
BILLINGS YELLOWSTON, MT 59103 from Dealer, RESSLER MOTOR COMPANY,
L&#% W. MAIN BOSEMAND, MT. 59713-0400,
right corner was

11

Hand written in the upper

021 /9/0434159."

At'lhe bottom, inside an elongated rectangular outline, ·
there was/were no indications to what/which of the four printed
names of finance companies, the purpored contract, if any, was
to be or was in fact assigned. (CT: 6)

But in the lower right

portion of the outlined portion in the boxed section Assigned
without recourse or with limited rec@urse, were the typed words:
"RESSLER ·.MOTOR COMPANY, (followed by a difficult to read
signature) and the ONLY written word, "Finance."
The Plaintiff's complaint was: l) labelled

only as:

" COM PLAI NT FOR CLAI M AND DELI VERY ( I . . 8 - 3 0 l ) (• CT. l ) ; 2 ) Pur •
portedly in Arzona, Marcipa Countery, "?Oday of April, 2009",
by a Kathleen Fitzgerald, whose named was first handprintd,
the handwritten number "20" appears twice in the verification,
(CT$) re the date of April, 2009; and the complaint itself is
purportly singed two (2)days earlier on "22 day of April 2009
- l -

by Laur1 E. Burri, Attroney for Plaintiff, (Ct: 3)
The foregoing verification by Kathleen Fitzgerald,
in Maricopa County, Arizona reads in the only two paragraphs
thereof:
"That I am an employee of Semperian, Inc., agent for
GeneraT Motors Acceptance Corporation and am actively engaged
in the operations of said corporation and has personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
Taat I have read the within and foregoing complaint,
knows the contents thereof and believes the facts therein
stated to be true and correct and makes this
th i s date

1

verification

behalf of the corpora ti on . " ( CT 4 )( Emphasis added)

(Then follows the date: "Dated this

:JI)_

day of April, 2009.")

On May 27, 2009, Defendant JOHN N. BACH, filed a NOTICE
OF MOTION & MOTION . . . SPECIALLY APPEARING TO STRIKE, VOID
ANY PURPORTED SERVICE of PROCESS, HIS PERSON ANn OVER PURPORTED
SOBJECT MATTERS JURISUICTTON, ETC. (IRCP, Rules 4(i)(20, 12
(4) & (5); Rule 4(b),(d)(2)" (CT 8-10
From this date, on and continuing through
JOHN BACH, filed February L,
the Honorable
ive

the FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST

2010 (CT 158 1 159~ assigned judge,

Gregpry W. Moeller, denied all mot~ons, affirmat-

defenses and counterclaims, many time unilaterally not

addressed not supported by any of plaintiff's counsel's filings
or supported arguments.

District

Judge Gregory Moeller, became

biasedly and impartially an advocate and third
Plaintiffs, to such a degree that his

attorney for

rreeiding over the hearings

violateddefendant and counterclaimant's JOHN BACH's procednal
and substantive rights of due process and equal protection.

- 2 -

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellant's specially a~pearing

motion of may 27,

2009 to strike, void any service over his person and purported
subject matters jurisdiction, stated very pertinently:
bhe offered complaint is in fact unverified and
the purported attached RETAIL INSTALMENT SALE CONTRACT,
is per public policies considerations void, if cot invalid
in the State of Idaho, is by its very tersm, paragraph 7,
subject to: "Federal law and Montana law apply to the
contract"; that facially/patently, defendant JOHN N. BACH
specially appearing was never a signator, no cobuyer, nor
anyguaranto, nor agent for deceased defendant CINDY LEE
BACH, nor has any purported estate or personal representative been named herein of CINDY LEE BACH, deceased, if
such representative does exist; that the purported "VERIFICATION" is by a wholly unknown and unqualified, nor auththenciated person in the State of Idaho, of a properly
licensed or formed corporation or as any purported agent
for General Motors Acceptance Corporation, which purported
statements of Kathleen Fitzgerald are utterly specious,
hearsay, hearsay upon speciulationss and other hearsay, without foundation or proper authenticaton and are completely
void and/or invalidate.'said offered specious complaint; and
that by its very terms of said form, does not disclose
that either GMAC, if registered or licenses in Idaho, was
intended as any loan creditor, nor that venue, place of
State of formation, performance and jurisdir+ion.was ever
intended nor agreed to be in Teton County, Idaho. Lastly,
based upon the forestated lack of person and subject matter jurisdiction there is no action for Claim and Deli~
eryper I.C. section 8-301 nor that of foreclosure on any
purported true sales agreement, or security agreement in
sales transaction or lease in fact; which do not continue
nor exist beyond the deaht of CINDY LEE RACH, now deceased.
See Stockman Bank of Montana v. Monkota, Inc., (Mont 2008)
342Mont 116 2008 MT 34. 180 P.3d 1125; Dillroe v. Devoe
? 23 ~~ o n t 4 7 , 7 2 4 P . 2 d l 7 l ; a nd a l s o ~ c G·i l 1 v . Le s t e r , l O8
Idaho 561, 700 P.2d 964 1269, 111 Idaho 841.
11

•

•

Were the personal, subject matter and law of Idaho applying issues resolved, to keep any jurisdictions in Teton
County, Idaho, such being extremely doubtful, the purported
plaintiff and all its claimed, unsworn agent$, etc., have
failed to allege, of Idaho's U.C.C, section 9-l03(l)(d) and ,
the holdings of: Rockwell Inter. Credit Cor. v. Valley
Bal!lk (Idaho App 1985) 109 Idaho 406, 707 P.2d 517. 11 {CT 9-10)

3

Despite defendant's request for the presence ind use
6f a court reporter at all hearings before the Court, the
district court denied such due to funds and the illness of
its regular reporter.

The Court's minutes of July 7, 2009@

2;12 p.m. (CT 14-17) and the Association of Counsel, filed
after the hearing had concluded at 2:37 a.m, (CT 18-19) reveal the admission that

only plaintiff's filed a "claim and

delivery action to get possession of (the) vehicle." {CT 15)
Appellant argued that: "Car was registered in Bozeman
MT; was there for year and a half." ; "Concern is misuse of
contractual agreement that does not exist in point of time.";
"No where in agreement is there a provision where there is a
foreign application of laws."; and "-until care was rergistered
and relisted as secured collateral-there is not vehicle

This

is the woong court, wrong clause, wrong claim." {Ct 16)
On July 21, 2009

the district court judge denied Appellant's

motons to strike/quash service and to dismiss. (CT 20-24)
DISCUSSION, Part l.

Under

the heading, "The Court has jurisdiction

over Mr. Bach and the veiicle, the district court, crptically
stated:

II

The court would further note that Mr. Bach, has

not hesitated in the past to avail himself of the idaho Courts
when seeking redress for alleged legal wrongs against himl According to the Idaho's 'Long A~m Statute,' Mr. Bach has submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the State of Idaho by owning real
property in Idaho and transaction business here. Code Sec5-514(a)
and (c)."(CT 21)
(NOTE:The district court's unwarrant personal jab and criticism
as aforesaid for exercising his rights and objections, a~d other
misstatements and criticims of Appellant throughout memo's Decision
and discussions, (CT 22-24, will be addressed, infra, but ignored
4

district court's objective responsibiliies and duties as stated in
the Id ah o Su p e em e Co urt s r e c e nt ho l d i ng s f o u nd i n ~/ e s t ' s Pa c .
I

Reptr, 3rd Series, July 8, 2011, 252 P. 3d No. 3, pages 1255:.31,
to wit:

State of Idaho v. Lute, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257-59 (Opn by

Burdic, Justice (Lack of jurisdiction found after illegaYvoid
13 year served criminal sentence);

Stafford v. Kootenai County

et al 252 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Lack of jurisdiction and standing or
capacity to proceed, etc); and Fuller v. Dave Callister, et al,
@%@

P.3dl266, 1271-73 and 1274).)
August 8, 2009, Appellant filed his ANSWER BY DFFENDANT

PRO PER JOHN N. BACH, WITH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, and DEEENDANT
and COUNTERCLAIMANT REQUESTS A 12 PERSON JURY TRIAL WILL NOT
STIPULATE TO ANY LESS. (CT 25-30.)

John Bach denied in all capa-

cities and conjunctively, disjunctively , jointly and alternati ve ly

II

a l l a l l e g a t i o n s of pa r a g r a phs ( l ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) , ( 7 ) , ( 8 ) ,

(9), (10) and (11), or the validty, effectiveness or completeness,
certainty or claimed agreements, provisions and insertions of that
attached purportd retail inst~·lilment contract, purportedly executed
by CINDY LEE BACH, now deceased, 10 North 27St., Bil ling, Yellowstone MT 59103." (CT 20)
Appellant's ANSWER fhen per his paragraphs

2 and 3, denied

further, Par. 2, the he "owes, is indebted to/for or has any ob l i gation or responsibility to pay anu sum or sums of either ~24,047,
$2,490.00, $17059. 18, $13,175.00 nor $3,00, nor any other lesser
sums or at all as claimed . . "; (and)
per Par. 3, denies "that said complaint is one at all 'For Claim
and Delivery, (I.C. Sec 8-301) and further so denies on the aforesaid basis/grounds and averments all and each paragraphs (a) through
(f) of plaintiff's prayer, and expressly, specifically denies that
plaintiffs has anyrights to recovery of possession of said 2007
Chevolet Equinox, nor for any recovery of ~17,059. 1~ nor for any
prejudgment interest of $4. 16 per day fron any commencement date nor

at all; denies further, that plaintiff has any claim, right or
abilities to have such vehicles sold at either public or private
sale in anymanner nor in accorance with Article 9, Chapter of the
Idaho Uniform Commercial Code, and futher denies on all aforesaid
basis, that plaintiff is entitled to recovery nor can it recover
all costs and attorneys fee incurred, in case of default or otherwise whatsoever of the sum of $3,000.00 or any sum. (CT 26-27)
11

Under and in Appellant s INDIVIDUAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES,
1

he averred specific legal and factual barred aswell as illegalities and public offenses/ violations of public policies, per
graphs 4 through 8 .(CT 27-28)
set forth an additional
through e). (CT 28)

par-

Affirmative defenses paragraph 9,

and further issues, per subparagraphs a)

These five additional separate torts were:

a)

An unsafe, dangerous and defective vehicle, to operate
in high alpine country, roads and highway arteries
. . . (as)exist in Teton Counties, Idaho and Wyoming
over and via Teton Pass and other highways through Yellowstone and/or Oubose, Wyoming, etc.

b)

A lemon vehicle under Montana laws-statutes.

c)

Breaches of express & implied warranties of fitness
for particular pu' ·
...
rposes, of merchant1b1l1ty, etc under
Idaho and Montana statutes- Mont EPA, MCA 61-4-502/3.

d)

Deceptive and unfair commercial practice of sales-financing under Idaho & Montana statutes, MCA 30-14-224(1)
and.30-14-133(1).

el

Violations of Federal RICO Act, per interstate commerce
transgression with 2 rrior overt acts of a jointly run
enterprise, conspiracy and orqanization in fact, criminally;
plus violation of the Idaho Racketeering Statute, by
the current and other unlwful, unfair and corrput collection practices, which may require this counterclaim to
be amended to initiate a class actionfor moneys so laundered. (CT 28)

Appellant's CDUNTEP.CLAIMS,"Tn conjunction, collusion. joint
venture and civil conspiracy, etc., with General Motors and Resseler Motor Company of Bozeman, Montans, along with other unknown
counterclaim defendants

.designated for now as DOES 1 through 20,

per his paragraph 11, he incorporated his previous paragraphs l
-

5 -

through 9, as separate counterclaims.
Appellant's counterclaim's last three paragraphs, numbered
ll through 13,

Paragraph 11, averred that GMAC,

"and those

entities, persons, etc., acting ith it have slandered, both
the title and ownership, possession, use and value of said Chevolet
Equinox vechicle, and further, have crafted without anu mutual
agreement having been entered, to falsely now assert, cliam and
pursue an illegal, void and criminal act of seeking to collect
moneys where there is no contract in existence to do so; such efforts
being against counterclaimant JOHN N. BACH, who neither a signator,
guarantor nor surety on the illeoal contract, no ionger existing."~CT 29)
Paragraph 13 stated:
"By design, manufacture and national and states' marketing
efforts of counterclaim defendant and said entitles/persons acting
in conjunction or with joint tortious relationships, built and
sold a dangerous, defective and unsafe product which was sold to
JOHN N. BACH's wife, to use over said high mountain roads and highways.

Counterclaim defendatn and its cofeasors failed to disclose

that the automatic breaking system, the transmission and four wheel
drive features, would not and didnot operate safely via road and
s ea so ns ' co nd i t i ons t he re o n , n or ma 11 y e nco u nt e red i n I d a ho , Mon t a n a ,
l.Jyomi ng and other near states." ( CT 29-30)
Paragraph 14 s language averred generally that the "proximate
1

result . . . did violate the rights of counterclaimant, and his
wife when alive as to those claims set forth, in paragraph 9,
subp.:iiagraps b), c), d) and e), of page 4, supra." (CT 30 )
GMAC's RESPONSE TO COUNTERCLAIM was filed Aug. 21, 2009 (CT 31-33:
7

Dec. 9, 2009, Respondent's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDMENT
was filed. (CT 34-35) GMAC's MEMORANDUM IN SUPBORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

"The basis and qrounds for this Motion (was)set forth

in the (Respondent's) Memorandum in Support

. . and is supported

by the record and pleadings on file with the Court." (Ct 34)
Respondent's Memorandum, contended Appellant

per the

Decree of Summary Administration re In the Matter of the Estate of
of Cindy L. Bach, Teton case number 08-420 was awarded the 2007
Equinox (misspelled as Equimax)and the Decree provide that John
Bach "shall assume and be responsible for all indebtedness which
might be a cliim against the estate.'

An affidavit of Launa

E. Burri in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
had a copy of the DECREE OF SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION (&15-3-1205(b)I .C.)
attached thereto. (CT 35, 42-44)
GMAC's memorandum claimed it was entitled to possession
of the vehicle and in the last sentence before its eoNCLUSION
stated:

"lastly, the counterclaim filed by Defendant JOHN BACH

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should
be dismissed.h (CT 40)

No where in said memorandum nor in any

document did GMAC's counsel address, set forth nor cite any arguments, case or legal authorities of said statment, which appeared
as a personal, biased and prejudical extra judicial involvement
of the district court judqe violatino Apellant's substantive due
process rights. (CT 40)

Respondent's counsel filed no further affi-

davit and relief completely on the purported(invalid /inadmissible)
verification of Kathleen Fitzgeral, an employee of Semperian, Inc.,
'1-)ho stated she "believes the facts therein stated to be true and
correct." (Ct 4)
8

December 11, 2009 Appellant filed a Motion for Immediate
Court's order Continuing Summary Judment, Jan. 5, 2010;
and for Farther Immediate Order STriking Plaintiff's said Filings
and it's Unverified/Unsigned Co~plaint, IRCP, Rules ll(a) Verif i c a t i o n ; 56 ( c ) & ( g ) ; & l 2 ( f ') .

( CT 48 - 50 )

The b a s i s of s uc h

requested continuance was due to Appellant's personal and family
plans to celebrate

Montenegrian Orthodox Church Christmas Festiv-

ities per the Gregorian calendar, Jan 4-8, 2010

in Southern Calif.

(CT 48-49)
In Appellant's such request and motions

stated:

" . . . Earlier 1 this Court in its Memorandum DEcision denying
Defendant's Mot,on to Quash Service of Process and Motion for
Dismissal, dated Oct. 21, 2009, page 2, paragraph 2, thereof,
'incorrectly'reached the conclusion that defendant had not raised any authorities for his oral argument that the plaintiff's
complaint was unverified by an out of Idaho state, corporate
(purported) agent, not registered nor licensed in and by Idaho
law to so sign or purportedly verify said plaintiff's complaint.
The statements by the court therein were never refuted by Plaintiff's counsel, and during oral argument, JOHN N. BACH, was both
physically andmentally affected by a most recent stroke, trobotic
complete" which required his use of a cane and other prosthetci
devises to appear at such oral heari~g; defendant was on said
date still in throws of rehabilitative physical and speech therapy for such strokeeffects." (CT 49)
11

Appellant then, "after further reveiw and research"

was

submitting that Rule 11 (a), Rulell(c) and 56(c)(d) and (e)

of

the purported verification of plaintiff's complaint "mast be
stricken as a matter of law and the entire motion for summary
judgment is without jurisdiction, legal nor factual basis. citing
among four cases, that of Evans v. Twin Falls Co., 118 Idaho 210,
796 P.2d 87 (1990), cert.den. 498 U.S. 1086, 111 S.Ct. 960, 112
L.Ed 2d 1048(199l)(must show sath as required per I.C. 51-109);
and Tri-State Land Co. v. Roberts, 131 Idaho 835, 965 P.2d 195 (Ct.
App. 1998) citing also to Rule 56(e)
a

re form of affidavit~

January 19, 2010

Ap~ellant filed further his OPPOSITION,

REFUTATIONS& MOTION TO STRIKE, VACATE & DENY WITH PREJUDICE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIBN FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (CT 51-50)

He further

filed therewith his personal AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. BACH, consisting
of five pages (CT 56-59)

attached to which was his deceased wife's

copy copy of a much different and incompleted, restricted terms
and verbal conditions of effectiveness,

The Clerk's Transcript has

an incompletf:,iphotocopy as CT 60).
Appellant has ob~ined an verified copy of the complete
document which Cindy L. Bach signed, without any agreemett, commitment or anyaddendum whatosever, that GMAC was the financing credit
entity.

Such certified copy is made a part

hereof, as APPENDIX

ONE, to this APPELLANT"S OPENING BRIEF, on the right inside last
cover page hereof.

Said APPENDIX ONE is a corrected and replaced

page CT 60 of the Clerk's Transcript herein,

Within APPELLANT's s~~d OPPOSITION, REFUTATIONS & MOTION
to Strike Plaintiff's Summary Judgment were three (3) complete
p a ge s ( CT 5 4 - 56 ,}

" ma ny u n pr ,J v e n a nd s u ppo s e d l y

r e qu i r ed

no t

just averred fact, to wit:
"l. Does GMAC have standing, as it is now a matter of
common knowledge and elgal fact that GMAC IS IN BANKRUPTCY?
2. Did Cindy Bach ever sign a completed contract of agreement with RESLLER MOTOR CO. of Bozeman for the purchase
of what she specified she wanted in a vehicle she sought
to purchase?
',3,

What written authority did Cindy Bach execute with and
for GMAC, withfull knowledge of what GAMAC was financing?

4. When, how and per what recording, registering or filing
in both the States of Montana and Idaho did Cindy Bach
ever consent in writing to a security interest or right
to be held by GMAC in the vehicle she did purchase?
l0

5. Under what showing of both specified personal knowledge and qualifications did supposedly an employee
(Kathleen Fizgerald) of Semperian Inc, possess and
utilize, to pruportedly sign the verification of the
complaint? (The District Court both in error and haste
in its conclusions assert forth in its Memorandum
Decision upon whicn Plaintiff reliefs. See Mobley
and Sons, Inc-~-v~-weave~ (Mont. 2009) 218 P.3d 472
specifically a-t PAGE 472 !attorney's affidavit flawed and
functionally defective, as his being, "familiar with
the facts herein,~ was clearly testifying to information
provided by his client, the veracity of which he had no
:personal knowledge."); also: State Far.m Fire and Cas. v.
Forced Aire (Utah App. 2009) 202 P.3d 299, 303-304 (Contractor's affidavit in o~~osition to summary judgment
based on his own person knowledge and created material
genuine issues of fact which m~re than precluded granting of any summary judgment; credibility and wPight of
evidence is for a jury to decide.
6. Did theform agreement, a true copy of which is attached
to JOHN BACH's Affidavit hereto, meet the public policies
of Montana or was it such of unsonscionabilities, coercion, fraudulent practices, etc?
7. If GMAC does not have either standing, capacity to sue
or even an secuirty interests in said vehicle WHAT
IRREFUTABLE FACTS AND IDAHO LAWS OR STATUTES ALLOW IT
NOW TO SEEK REPOSSESSION AND RESALE WITHOUT ANY STATED
ACCEPTABLE CURRENT C0MMERCIBLE REASONABLE PRACTICES?" (CT 54-5E
The AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. BACH, offered Jan 10,, 2010 in e,pposition to Respondent's summary judgment motion(CT 58-57, par. l
ahd 2~ set forth his legal attorney and law practices qualifications ofover 28 years of practice in commercial code repossessions of vehicles, tractors, mobile homes, motor bike, snowmobile, etc.,, for the testimony -he gave via said affidavit.
In his paragraph 3 (CT 57-58,) ge testified:
1 personallyaccompanied, driving Cindy L. Bach, my
wife, to Ressler Motor Co., of Bozeman, Montana and
was present personally during the discussions and negotiations conducted aad had on or about January 6, 2997,
as U recall a S~turday, No representatives nor officers
of GMAC were present nor took part in such discussions.
Most auspiciously, the officials of Ressler Motors were
agreed that it as the selling dealership would finance
personally the vehicle to be sold Cindy, as one of the
owners of Jackson Hole Aviation, where Cindy was the chief
11

11

accountant and human resources director, was a personal
friend of the owner of Ressler, and would guarantee any
payments. At. no time was GMAC to be a lender nor financer of the vehicle to be purchased by Cindy, and for
this reason GMAC was never identified nor state nor XX ed
in any box or blanks as financing the vehcile. For such
reasons, the vehicles was to be registered and licensed
in Montana, Bozeman, using beth Ressler's and Jackson
Hole A+iation's local Bozeman addess or post office box.
11

11

11

"4.

Attached hereto is a complete, accurate and unaltered
copy of the document signed by Cindy Bach which reveals
the numerous blanks which were neither completed nor referenced in anymanner for financing trhoug GMAC." (CT 57-58)
The attached copy received by Cindy Bach, did not have

the handwritten

numbers, as was contained on the copy attached

to the Complaint such missing numbers of

11

02 /9/0434159". (See

Page 1, supra last sentence of first full paragraph.)
In Appellant's CLOSING BRIEF RE SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION
TO STRIKE, DENY & VACATE WITH PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, filed Feb. 1, 2010 (CT 63-75) he stated and
argue that: "The contract form which CiNDY L. BACH singed has
been more than falsely altered, misrepresentedand even per
the inadequate verification of the complete for purposes
of consideration supporting any plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, has established a deceit, fraud and abuse
of legal process byplaintiff and its attorney upon this
court and defendant JOHN N. BACH,.
11

Most significantly the choice of law clause which plaintiff seesk to apply was never stated in its forged/fraudulent copy of the supporse written agreement. In Milanovich
v, Schnibben, 2007 MT 128, 337 Mont, 334, 160 P.3d 562,
it was held~ . . that under Montana Law forum selection clauses are pri~faciJ.valid
So, if the Plaintiff's copy of
the forged and falsified written agreemtn was admissible
and relevant . . , then the Montana forum selection clause
for the action tobe tried in Montana is valid and this acttion should have been filed in Montana .. But Milanovich,
supra, has more cognent application because it also held that
if the resisting party can ~Row that the clause is unreasonable under the circumstances, to wit: that 'the agreement
is not 'deliberately and understandingly made,' and if the
contract langugge does not 'cleraly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver' of personal jurisdiction',
1

1

,

12

t hu s be com i ng/ being a co nt r act of ad hes i o n , es pe c i a l l y
"when a party possessing superior bargaining power•
,nresents a standardized form of agreement to a party wbose
· c~oice remains either to accept or reject the contract withou~
t he o p po rt u n it y t o ne go t i at e i t s t er ms . Zi gr an g · v . U. S . Ea n corp Piper Jaffray, Inc. 2005 MT 282, 329 Mont, 239, 123 P.3d 237."'
(CT 64-65)
Appellant further pointed out Plaintiff had tJ expressly
11

stated under penalty of perjury with specific factual details it
it had complied within four (4) months after the vehicle

was

kept and required to be licensed in Idaho, citing I.C. 28-9-801,
28-9-708 and also 28-9-304 & 307.

Plaintiff haa not pled and

c?uld n?t· ~lead it had a~y sec~r,ty interest perfected by Idaho
laws. J;C. 28-9-3 2)c), subparts, (d)(e)(f) and (g)(2) and 28-

28-9-316(a) (CT

66)

Section

28-9-316(a) provided:

"A security interest perfee.ted purauant to the law of
the jurisdiction designated in section 28-9-301 (1) or
28-9-305(c) remains perfected until the earliest of:
. . (2) The expiration of four (4) months afer a change
of debtor's location in another jurisdiction; or (3) Tee
expiration of one (1) year after a transfer of collateral
to a person that thereby becomes a debtor and is located
in another jurisdiction . . . (b) . . . If the security 1 interest does not become perfected under the law of the other
jurisdiction before the earliest tiem or event, it become
unperfect and is deemed neve to have been perfect . . .
(CT 66-67)
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Attached to Defendant's

Closing Brief were a confirming

Feb. 10, 2010 Letter request from Appellant to the IDABO SECRETARY

OF STATE WITH COPIES OF FILED (RECORDED DOCUMENTS THAT:
l.

SEMPERIAN, INC. , File Number C 161651, had file
A CERTIFICATE OF WITHDRAWAL from doing business in
Idaho.

2.

The Application for Withdrawal of SEMPERAIN, INC.,
WAS GRANTED AND IT CEASED DOING BUSINESS AS A CORPORATION IN IDAHO, Septeber 26, 2008. (it had surrendS~pe~ i2~ a~ca@rity to transact business in Idaho,
•
'
,J
(CT 68·75)
l3

A SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. BACH, Pro Se, was
filed February 19, 2010, which attached as EXHIBIT "2" the
foregoing letter and Idaho State Secretary of State CERTIFICATE
OF WITHDRAWL, per I.C. sec. 30-101520 of SEMPERIAN, INQ.,(CT 79-81)
Appellant's

FURTHER EMORANDUM BRIEF RE: To Strike, Vacate,

Etc., Witb Prejudice Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion was
filed February 19, 2010. (Cf 82 - 89}

Appellant sought sanctions

against Respondent's counsel per IRCP, Rules

ll(a}(l} and Rule

56(g} on the basis that such a,torneys knew that the verification
by Kathleen Fizgerald was a sham. stating expressly:
"WE do not know what was the exact employee position of
Kathleen Fitzgerald with samperian, Inc., if she was so
employed. But she dated and signed her one parge verification, two whole days before Laura E. Burri prepared the
complaint and signed it herself. To conclude that neither
knew that Semperian, Inc., was disfranchised of its ow~
accord from doing or conducting any business in Idaho is
ludicrous, especially since Ms. Burri practices in Boise,
Idaho and could have ascertain upon reasonable inquiry
that Semperian, Inc., had no standing, capacity or authauthority to do business in Idaho. Ms. Fitzgerald, if she
was a key and relevantly mangerial employee would have
known that as well. But for this Court to make such inquiries of both said women requires their prewence before
this court with the rights of due process and equll protection assured deeendant to personally cross examine them
on the record. Ms. Burri, aavoids any appearances before
this court other than the associate counsel, who appears
further progrmed to ,,m1slead and deceive this court."(CT84-85
Appellant further in said FURTHER MEMORANDUM BRIEF,

pointed

out that IRCP, Rule ll(c) expressly requires/states who must
verify the pleadings when a corporation is a party, to wit "by
an officer thereof" and especiallu when a purported verified
pleading is to be used as a basis for an affidavit to support
a summar- judgment motion the "a verification upon personal knowleged is required." (CT 85}
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Appellant in his FURTHER MEMORANDUM

BRIEF, cited POSEY

v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO, 141 Idaho 477, 11 P.3d 162 (Ct. App.
2005)

where "it was hled that although a witness' affidavit

for the corporation offerd to support a summary judg,emt ~ption
was conclusionary absent any foundational showing his partiaipation

in the transaction or his indeed personal knowledge of

the facts which he oversaw and a~tested; insofar as any documents
pffered tb show the truth of assertions contained within them, the
documents were hearsay for w~ich no excepton was established."(CT 86
Besides raising and citing the failure of compliance with
Idaho's Statute of Frauds, I.C. 28-2-201(1), 28-2-209(2)(3) amd
I.C. 9-505(2) as Cindy had not signed for financing with GMAC
per her incomplete document (CT 60 and APPENDIX ONE hereto,
the Complaint fails to state a cause of action and can be dismissed
with prejudice "upon the included basis that defendant's said
motions, oppposition ememos and requests, are also a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, per I.R.C.P, Rule 12{c) in his favor
and against plaintiff." (CT 88)
Appellant's said FURTHER MEMORANDUM BRIEF, in its last
two (2) pages, sterting with the last full paragraph on CT 88
highlights and sets forth four ( 4) ·m.or,e cont ro 11 ·j ng cases, three of
the Idaho Supreme Conrt and one, Tomer v. Gates, from the~9th
Cir., CA 1987) 811 F.d 1240, 1243, holding that party's failure
even as late as oral argument, to withdraw

his motion for summary

judgment which was frivolous was not only unbecoming, but not
to be taken lightly by the Ninth Circuit court as to its ruling
and award of sanctions. (CT 88-8,Q)
-

l5

C.

GRANTING OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FnR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND WRIT OF PIDSSESSICN.
May 3, 2010, the district court filed its MEMORANDUM

DECISION, CONSISTING OF9
there i n s tat e s per " 1
granted!'

11
,

"

PAGES. (CT ,90-98)

The DISCUSSION.

GMAC ' s s um mar y j u d gm en t mot i on i s

At the bottom of said page (CT 93)

is stated:

"At issue in this case is whether Mrs. Bach's demise
affe~ts GMAC'$ ability to enforce the 88nract. As
we discussed ,n the Court's July 21, 2 9 Memorandum
Decision, Mrs. Bach's deaht did not leave GMAC without
remedy to enforce the financing agreement. The Court
previously held: (l) the Court has in personam jur~sdiction over Mr. Bacb and in rem jurisdiction over.
the car; (2) GMAC's complaint was properly verified;
(3) Mr. Bach was properly served and is a proper party
to thesuit; (4) Mr. Bach assumed for Mrs Bach's financinq
agreement when he assumed indebtedness and claims against
Mrs. Bach's estate. lO" . . 10 Memorandum Decision of July
21, 2009 Denying Dft's Motions to Quash Serv •. of Process & for
Dismissal." (CT 93)
The district court judge then reviewed (more than selectively and
biasedly, Appellant's issues raised by his counterclaims, but claimed
"These are conclusory allegations", when Respondent had made no
fromal summary judgment motion on the Countercl?'m;, affirmative answers and issues raised.

(CT

94-95)

~~~ta~~n§al~sFJt~i~~gePS~~~!~rg~e8fa~h~ ~g~t~hd 0 tslBmed
the obligation of the agreement on December 1 2008
when ~ud?e Luke signed the Decree of Summary idmini;t~at ion. "
The district court then, without further analysis or citation
to case authorities "dismissed (Bach's counterclaim in its
entirety. But there were numerous counterclaims which it did
not address.
1 6 -

A1though there was no summary judgment motion made re
the counterclaims, and no requests for any tried with finality
judgment, the district court took 11 judicial notice that it is
dangerous to drive in many places in Idaho during winter, including
Teton County,
This is true whether one is driving in an Equinox
or a Snowcare. Mr. Bach's mere assertion that there are braking and
four-wheel-drive problems with his vehicle in Teton County is insufficient to allow GMAC to form an answer or put them on notice
as to complaint. Such claims do not meet even the liberl pleading
requirements of Rule B(a}(l} and 9(f} of the Idaho Rules of Civil
P(locedure. 2011 (CT 96}
(NOTE: At this point and per the disrict court's giving of his
asserted credtble evidence, expertise at that without any foundationbeing presented, he lost all standing as an impartial jurist
and was required to immediately recuse and disqualify himself,
but not without first vacating and striking all his memo decisions
and rulings against Appellant.
(CT 96-97).
May 17, 2010 DEFENDANT & COUNTERCLAIMANT JOHN N. BACH, filed
Four POST MEMORANDUM DECISION MOTIONS. (CT 99-107) Appellant
also filed therewith a FURTHER AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. BACH, re lack
of standing and capacity of GMAC due to the undispute existence of
GMAC's bankruptcy and the lack of GMAC to "show 1tending and
capacity to pursue their sole claim and delivery action." (CT 108-09)
Appellant filed a FURTHER EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HIS
MOTIONS FILED May 17, 2010. (Ct 110-0114) As this Idaho Supreme
Court reviews de novo this appeal from the granting by the dsstrict court,without following or being bound in any manner by
the district court's Memorandum Decisions or rendered Judgment,
Appellant's entire FURTHER MEMORADNUM IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTIONS
FILED May 17, 2010 are attached hereto following renumbered as
pages 18, 19,20, 2.1, and 22 hereafter.
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,JOHN N. BACH
Post Of ce Box 101/4000N, 1530E
Driggs, ID 83422
Tel: (208) 354-8303
Defendant and Counterclaimant
Pro Se
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IDAHO, TET0N CO~TY

Action NO:

G~1AC,

Plainti
&
Counterclaim
Defendant,

CV 09- 172

DEF'ENDANT/COUNTERCLAIM.7\NT'
BAC!-i' S '?• lRTHR.R.
~mMORANDUM IN SU1?'PORT 0,;,
HIS MOTIONS FILED Mav 17. 2010.

,T0HN N.

v.
DA'F.E:: ,Jul. 6, 2010 TtME: 2o. m.
PLACE: Teton County Courthouse

,JOHN N • BACH ,

Defendant &
Counterclaimant.

----------------I
This 1:i'URTHE:q MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP ALL THE MOTIONS

filed by JOHN N. BACH, Pro Se, on May 17, 2010 is Presented
in view of the absolute lack and avoidance of any resoonse
by nlaintiff GMAC and its counsel.

,JOHN N. BACH'S motions

should be all granted as without onnosition or refutations,
oer mmtion for reconsideration and Rule 60 (b),. all cited subsections.
I.

THE ENTIRE MEMORANDUM DECISION Or' Mav 4, 2010 SHOULD
BE SET ASIDE, VACATED AND ANNULLED.
The .Memorandum Decision of :\.iay 4, 2010

neither final

either as a judgment nor final order with jurisdiction of
subject matter, nor with any personal jurisdiction and most
certainly,

is without any statement or averment of any viable

claim or cuase of action; most certainlv it is

not state

any claim whatsoever for claim and delivery
I.e. 8-301.(DSsoite the Court's predisoosed mindset that "it is uncontested"
ti1at Cindy Bach "financed" said vehicle with GMAC, such has always
been contes
, refuted and disoroven by the affidavits and motions
of JOHN N. BACH, who is neither a cosigner, nor guarantor, nor
indemini er nor hold harmless nrornisor to GMAC who in two §tates,
wilfully & intentionally failed, refused to per
t any security intof the vehicle in ~ontana and Idaho!)
..J~·mACH' s F"u:::-thr Mern re His

I'll

1"

rsw - f_f 1 ed ~1ay 17, :-?01()

A.0.B.

o.

l--.

P.
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A.

BASIC:·:RULES, PRINCIPLES WHICH APPLIED BUT
WERE )]QT FOLLOWED BY THE JUDGE HEARING PLAINTIFF'S SU1'1.MARY JUDGMENT MOTION.

1. A Pro Se litigant is entitled to the same application of the rules of ~ivil procedure and controlling statutes, in the same manneE as apply to a licensed Idaho attorney.
The judge did not do so herein. Shelton v. Shelton (Idaho
2009)
225 P.2d 693,6~~99(Judqe herein created unique procedural hurtles, dealing with summary judgment and motion to dismiss re
ilure to state claim)?lt's counsel's ~iilure to show
any perfection of security interest per his offered cooied 8 naqes
of Montana's statute 61-3-103, (1) (d), comnlier col'l1Itlents narts
(5) &"'(6), required the granting of
fendant summary judgment!)

2. The subject mtter jurisdiction issue mav be raised ·at
any time, sua sponte or otherwise. T ..J. T. , Inc ,v. Mori ( ldaho
Apti!l 10, 2010) 230 P.3d 435, 436-437 (S/J motion separate
judqment per Rule 58(a) .) The district court's ignoral of further refusal/failure by nlainti£f to orove anY securitv oerfection ner Idaho statutes in the Idaho regis
vehicle in question, further doomed any right/basis oer Rilile 56(a) through (e)
to grant summary iudqment to olaintiff & further showed no viable
claim of claim and aeliverv shought by olainti
3. Due process, both procedurally and substantively requires a fair and impartial judge who cannot become either an
advocate for plaintiff GMAC, nor an expert or percipient witness either disclosed nor sua sponte, nor give and apply his
expert testimony w1thout filing of notices
such intent,
his exoert qualifications, foundational bass, etc., all of
which must be heard, determined and ruled upon by another
quali ed trial judge on all evidentiary quali cations basis,
with fixed/focused ap?lication of exclusion re hearsay, unfounded opinions, speculations, inadmissible and nonrelevant statements, etc. f'Mlsey v. I.A.C. (2005) 141 Idaho 125; C'.a-perton v. l\.T. Massey
Coal, Jun. 8, 2009, U.S. Suorerre Court Dkt 08-22, 556 U.S. ___; Litkey v.
U.S. (1994) 510 U.S. 551.
SPEX:IAL 1>l'0rE: Under I.R.E., Rule602, 603, 703, 704 and 705, the qualifications of any exoert must be evidentiarv and foundationailv':Bstiatlil.tshed
for any exrert ooinion or testirrony to be given, as is stated. by the distcourt judge when he "takes judicial notice that it is dangerous to drive in
many nlace<::: in Idaho during the winter, includinq Teton Countv. This is true
whether one is drivinq in an Equinox or a Snowc:at." (Menu flecision, P. 7)
Nhat is the iudqe's quali.fication to rnaJce such sneculative, hearsav an.d
irrelevant/inadmissible sua soonte oroof/evidence in aidinq nlaintiff and
dismissinq all counterclaim causes of: action in one Alice in Sro.-,land swcoo?
\.bst egregiously, where/when 1vas such judicial notoo facts determined in litiqation & when did .John Bach be qiven i'I. hearing to refute such, i::ier IJ:IB, 201, e4. Where issue of what are the terms of a contract,
sec
nreliminarv showing bY plaintiff must/is required that anv
enforceable contract must be slifficientlv definite, certain and
its terms and requirements so ascertainable of acts to be Performed and when cerformance is required, complet~br not by
the plaintiff; not only must any uncertainties or .,ar:Jb1qu1ties
ot a contract be identified but the court must implv the covenant
of good faith and fair dealin into the contract to be Performed
by the plaintiff seeking to enforce it. Spokane Structures, Inc.
':L........ Equtjab]e In:irestment (Idaho 2010) 2267:>:Td 1263, 1266-68);
11
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Potlach Educ. v. Potlatch School Dist. (Idaho Feb. 3, 2010)
226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (interpreting ambiguous term
issue of
fact)>.arid11281 (court must implv covenant of good faith and
fair dealings.in all contracts ~hich raises and is also a
question of fact).
IF THE DISTRICT COURT WRONG:1:<'ULLY DISMISSED ALL C.:OUN'!'E~CLAIMS, WHEN NO RULE 12(b) (6) MOTION WAS PROPERLY MADE
NOR SUPPOR':T'ED BY ANY REQUI>IBO 1-IB.110RANDUM OF AUTHORITIES
BY PLAINTIFF, SUCH DISMISSAL MUST BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO COUNTERCLAIM.ANT TO l<ILE AN AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM.

T]T.

Counterclaimant's causes of action des~ite the wording and
unsupported conclusions of the dis

judge,

more than inaccurate; they reveal the prejudici
the district judge, who should no lonqer ores

5-8 are
mindset of
over this action.

At oage 5, the district judge, without any basis of case authority
states:' ":Perfection and recording issues would af
t GMAC' s rights
as to other ere di tors, but would ha11Je' mo,-'ef feet on Mr. Bach's
obligation to pay under the contracts."
Such conclusion is more than specious and a red herring non se~uitor.
GMAC filed solely a claim and delivery action per I.C.

8-.vn.

It

has not stated any other c~uie of action and must show it has-not
only standing as a oartv aqreed to by Cindv Bach, but that it timelv,
as required further adequately oerfected its security interest under
both .1v1ontana and Idaho laws; which it admitted did not.
The further unfounded conclusions at oaoe B, too paraqraoh
of said Memorandum Decision, narticular sentence thereof, that:
"There is nothing in the record to suggest GMAC has been
fraudulent or devious in its efforts to receive oavment under
the financing agreement."; (are wholly inaccurate!)
Indeed the facts and evidence presented by JOHN BACH have shown
exactly that; moreover, the attemot by G~AC's counsel to mislead
s Court per the coov of '·1ontana statute 61-:3-103 (1) (d), corrunents

(5)

&

(6), that somehou it is excused from oer

ctinq its claimed

security is beyond not just the orovisions and rules of ao~lication
,mBACH 's

Pur. ~le.rro re His ~1tns f i l
1

en '10:r

~ 7,

2010

P.

3.

A.O.B.

P. 20.

Rule 56, particularly, Rules 56(a)

through 56(e).

Further, the other statements, top page 8, are beyond
the issues of said Rule 56, as ther1d.i!strict court judge is not
hearing evidence in/after a trial and ruling, Toe is restricted
to what plaintiff has either been able to show or cannot show
at this stage,of a limited suffiffiary judgment request.

No where

in GMAC's complaint does it allege, the vehicle was/is plooged
to it and it has always had and still has actual possession of
it to enforce that pleage. Thusly, the very absence of any security
perfection dooms any viable cause of action by GT-1..Z\.C for cla.ii.m and
delivery. Here, the district court's very own words show/establish
that GHAC did not and cannot show·.it had all elements of olaim and
delivery which is strictly a statutory remedy based solely upon
a timely and legally perfected security interest!
Dairy Systems, Inc., 2009)

Aardema v. U.S.

215 P3d 505, 513; Thomas, Idaho, 126

Idaho at 531, 887 ~.2d at 1038.
When now the district court assumes an att0r,ney's advocacy
role for GMAC as to facts and arguments which are bevond what the
record shows and is requ.ired for summary judgment rules' aoolication,
in short, legally covering <V1AC' s misuse and abuse of orocess per
no basis whatsoever for claim and delivery, then, how can said
same district judge preside o*er a jurv tri~l, which is·the entitlement right of JOHN N. BACH?? Nor does, the reoeated, but inaccurate
conclusion, that by "Mr. Bach assumed both the benefits and obligations of his deceased \vife's estate" eliminate with clarity, exactness and unambiguity, that he guaranteed all her debts, even those
unenforceable and not legally binding?
fuses BOBICA posturinq- -

It isn't CINDY who now re-

it's her surviving husband who asserts

all riahts that she had and those which he has a0ainst such wilful
,Jl\JBACH's Pur

Memo re IIis

Mtr01fJi-!:d

~-1ay 17,

201')

P. 4.

A.OB.

P.
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deceptively abuse of orocess and extortion by GMAC, who has
shown no rights nor basis to be granted any summary judgment.
If the district court is any where close to accurate
that somehow "Mr. Bach's counterclaim is dismissed in its entit~ty

11

,

such should be without prejudice to filing an amended

counterclaim, which may include dece~tive and illegal business
practices by GMAC and even its counsel of record herein.

The

terms of the contract signed by Cindy Bach with ~be Equinox dealer,
retained her right to sue it and any assignee,, GM.AC, under "1ontana
and U.S. federal laws and statutes. Lastly, as no security nerfection
has been established, GMAC is not entitled to any form of attorney fee1
If it is to take back said vehicle it must be in full satisfaction!,,
III.

DATED:

ALL THREE MOTIONS MADE BY JOHN :'J. BACH SHOULD BE GRAN'!'ED
AND THE DISTRICT COURT ,JUDGE DECLINE TO HEAR ANYTHING
FURTHER IN THIS ~1ATTER A._ND HAVE AN
JUDGE ASSIGNED.

July 2, 2010

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING:
I the undersigned hereby certify that on
July 2, 2010 I did mail copies of this document via U.S. :First
Class Mail to: Judge Gregory Moeller, C/0 Madison County Courthouse, Rexburg, ID 83440; Laura E.
ri, P.O. Box 2774, Boise,
ID 83701-2773; and Lance J. Schust
05 Corona~o , Idaho
Falls, ID 83404-7495.
/

~

A.O.B. P.

,JNBZ\CB's Fur. Merro re His Mtns

ffi1114

17, 2010
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(See Ct 115- 119)

Julf 19, 2010 Plaintiff's filed a RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JOHN._
BACH's POST SUMMARY JUDMENT MOTIONS. (CT 120-124), and an
unnotarized/unverified A AFFIAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JOHN BACH's POST SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS.
(CT 126-128) Plaintiff's counsel also filed an AFFIDAVIT OF COTS
AND PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, ON July 26, 2010. (CT 129-;30)
August 2, 2010, DEFENDANT-COUNTERCLAIMANT'S CLOSING BRIEF
RE OBJECTIONS, WITH MOTIONS TO STRIKE GMAC's LATEST FILINGS,
PURPORTED AFFIDAVIT, ETC. -OF LAURA BURRI, Et Al. (CT 131Appellant objected to the consideration or receipt of Laura
Burri'sunnotarized/unverified affidavit (CT 120-124) as not only
inadmissible but untimely, must be striken and denied usage.
Moreover, appellant objected the said affidavit was false and
an attempt to dilatorily amend the plaintiff's summary judgment
motion and offered in respons to Ap~ellant's said post aummary
judgm-ent motions without obtaining a formal order after motion
being made to permit such further unnotarize/unverified affidavit.
(CT 134-137)
On August 5, 2070, an AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF"S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JOHN BACH"S POST SUMMARU
JLIDMENT MOTIONS was filed without leave of court, nor any
order filed, argued and granted to do so. (CT 138-·;40) This
umaithorized, late and inadmissilbe affidavit had a purported
ITO sheet of "7/79/2010" of CINDY's E€fuinox, with 44,000 odometer miles on 2/29/2008 was listed, but no information when,
whether orif, within four (4) months of registered with an Idaho
license, an claimed security interest/lien on it was prefected-the information was more than useless, irrelevant and sp~~ulati· e hearsJy., conjecture and entirely inadmissible. (CT 140 )
September 3, 2010 the district court filed an AMENDED
.
t,l{~ORA~DUM DECISION, (CT l4l-155)which more than repeated
the Court's prior decisions, except it now denied Appellant had
been denied a fair and impartial judge (CT 142~15Jland denied
his Motion
Strike Lauri Burri 's two untimely affidavits. (Ct 152l 55 )
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D. FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED AND NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED
A FINAL JUDMENT AGAINST JOHN BACH, was filed February 1,
2011, ordering

money damages tota11ing $19,976.94

with

i nt ere st at 5 . 3 7 5% per annum, a ., \~ RIT , of Possess i on sh al l be
issued for therecovery of possession of said vehicle." (CT 158 _159 )
The WRITOF POSSESSION has issued and the vehicle has
been repossed inMarch 2011 but no notices of any sales, auctions
or biddings for resale of said vehicle or if any price or moneys
have been received nor if applied against the total moneys due
per the Final Judgment.
On March 15, 2011
.. . & APJ?.Ul

Appellant filed his NOTICE OF APPEAL

OF APPELLANTSI DEFENDA NTS CI NDY LEE BACH, ( de c e a s e d ) , a n d

JOHN NICHOLAS BACH, an individual (widower).

(CT

160-164)

Despite Appellant not having received timely and proper
NUTIFICAT!ON of when his opening brief was due, he received les s
_n,an eight days ago that his OPENING BRIEF IS DUE PER FIRST CLASS
OVERNIGHT MAILING, tefore midnight August 2, 2011.

-
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I S S U E S

APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL AND APPEAL OF CINDY L. BACH
(deceased) and JOHN NICHOLAS BACH, an individual (Widower), sets forth
seven

(7)

general issue,

at CT 16 2-163.

All said seven (7)

issues are revised, but included within the followina issues on Appeal:
ISSUE NO. l.

w~s
.JI

TKERE ANY CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT FORUM CLAUSE THAT

, I,

.

'

REQUIRED JURISDICTION AND VENUE TO BE IN MONTANA?
ISSUE NO. 2:

WAS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR CLAIM AND DELIVERY PROPERLY
~~RIFIED TO BE USED FOR PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT?

ISSUE NO. 3:

WAS THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE AUTHORI7ED BY SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RULES TO PERSONALLY AND WITHOUT ,,~OTICE AND
A PROPERLY HELD DUE :PROC~SS HEARING, TO GIVE HIS
HEftRSAY EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH HE USED AND APPLIED
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT?

IS~UE N0.4:DID GMAC, mislead, abuse the processes of the
DISTRICT COURT AND FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
REQUIRING THE DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT APPELLANT
A FAVORABLE J~DGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS?
Before

argument on these four (4) issues

and the many subissues raised by the original seven (7) issues
included therein from Appellant's said NOTICE OF APPEAL,
LANT , A PRO SE LITIGANT

i entitled to the same

Ap~el-

application of the

statutes, rulesand authorities cited and controlling, in the same
manner as apply to a licensed Idaho attorney.
25
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Shelton v. Shelton

(Idaho 2009) 225 P.3d 693, 698-699. The trial court judge
herein herein created unique proceedings and misinterpreta1,0HS
of statues and civil rules of procedure in dealing with
GMAC's unverified motion for summary judgment and ignoring
refusing to rule on Appellant's motion to dismiss complaint with
or grant him a motion for judgment on the pleadings re failure
of GMAC to state a cause of action to perfect in Idaho, timely
and oroperly any perfection of its unsupport perfection of
a secuirty inter(.si I.C. 28-9-312(c), (d)(e)(f) & (g)(2);
28-9-316(a)

CT pages 10 through ?.2 are incorporated herein.

Throughout the district court's rulings and memo decisions,
he cited and

used the Decree of Summary Administration, Dec. l,

2008as a matter of law that appellant thereby had received

pos-

q

session of the Euinox and assumed the oblisgation of the agrement
~

that CINDYLEE BACH had entered into when she purchased the car.
Butthe district court never ruled nor addressed the conflicting
evidence of what agreement signed or nonintegrated Cindy Bach
reached with RESSLER MOTOR CO and GMAC. Ct pages 14-17 are epecially
incorporated herein
Two (2) recent Idaho Supreme Court cases were violated
by the district court's more than delibarate oversights, to wit:
l.
Fullerv.Dave Callister (Idaho, 2011) 252 P.3d 1266, 1269
( "The party aginst whom the (summary) judgment will be entered
must be given adequate notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment sbould not be entered. It is
also true that a district court may not decide an issue not
raised inthe moving party's motion for summary judgment.")
The foregoing last seneence of Fuller. requires the reversal
of thedistrict court's granting of GMAC's unmade, unargued
and wholly unsupported motion to ~ismiss with prejudice all
of Appellant's affirmative defenses and numerous counterclaims against GMAC.)
- 27 -

Fuller also involved an ssignment of the purchase
agreement. (Here, GMAC never per its motion for summary
judgmetn, unverified, ever proved conclusively or
ptjerwose. that the Decree of Summary Distribution, ever
expressly or otherwise, constituted a waiver of and
intentional relinquishment of all known rights of
Appellant to resist, oppose and have the GMAC s unverified complaint dismissed with prejudice. Fuller, 252
P.3d 1266, 1273 ( A novation differs from an assignment
1

because it requires the assent of all parties . . . An
assignment is not a debt; & is full payment for something
now, even though receipt of part of the value may occur in
the future. An assignment is a formal transfer of property orproperty rights fron one to another, while a
wa i ver i s the i n tent ion a 1 re 1 i nqui sh men t of a known r i g ht .

11

}

Appellant never sought nor has he waived any of his
known rights of opposing, defendant and aefeating the limited
and unlimted claims of GMAC.
2. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment (Idaho 2010)
226 P.3d 1263, 1266-68}
(Not only must any uncertainties or ambiguities of a contract
be identified, and determined which terms and conditions
apply,but especially, the court must imply the covenant of
good faith and fair dealings into the contnact to be performed
by the plaintiff seeking to enforce. All of the foregoing issues
are of fact to be decided by a jury where required by either
party. (Appellant required per his answer, affirmative defenses and multiple counterclaims, a jury trial of 12 persona.
(CT 25}
Most reelvantly, J.C. 15-3-1205 (c} s wording does not
extinguish, nor relinquish, waive nor destroy Appellant's constitutional rights to refute, oppose and defeat GMAC's current complaint.
Any such interpreation by the district court that it does is more
than erroreou; itis constitutional "VOID" Fidelity STate BAnk v. North
Fork Hwy Dist. 35 Idaho 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781 (1922}
28 1

It is further
trial rights are

applicable that the Appelllnt,s·jury
guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution s
1

Article I, Clause 7.
Moreover, any waiver of jury trial,
as that of wiaver/relinquishment of a claim, ~rosecution or defense
thereof, cannot be made or enforced except in the manner provided by stature; such cannot and will not be implied in doubtful
or contested cases.
248 P. 22 (1926)

Neal v. Drainage Dist. No. 2, 42 Idaho 624,

Through all hearings, the district court judge more
than confusingly but deliberately accepted the purported verification of BMAC s complaint by KathleenFitzgerald, which oath was
1

not as required by I.C. 51-109; was not as a proven officer/
director of Semperian, Inc., per Rule 11 (c); and was 3) as an
unspecified agentor employee of Semperian, Irle, then

disenfranchised

and withdrawn from being an Idaho corporation and doing via such
corporation any business in Idaho . (CT 66-75, 79-81)
The following two (2) cases apply throughout all issues
raised infra, as do all arguments and authorities, pages 18-29
supra, lwhich l:y such reference are incorporated herein, infra as
applicably supprtinq 111 issues resolution tn Appellant's favor:
1

1.

Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co, 141 Idaho 477, 11 P3d 162
!Ct. app. 2005(A witnesses affidavit for corporation
offered in suppoort of summary judgment motion was

2.

conclusionary and without any foundat~onal showing of
his precise participation in the transaction or of his
acquiring or participating to acquire personal knowof the facts, etc., such was inadmissible hearsay
in violation of Rule 56(b) through (e).
Mobley and Sons, Inc. v. Weaver {Mont 2009) 218 P.3d
472! 475 {attorney s affidavit flawed as hersay, defective, he was clearly testifying to hearsay evidence
provided by his client.)
1

29

ARGUMENTS ON IN SUPPORT OF
All
ISSUES

ARGUMENT ON ISSUES NO. 1:

THERE WAS A COUNTRACT/AGREEMENT FORUM
CLAUSE , THAT REQUIRED GMAC'S
COMPLAINT FOR CLAIM AND DELIVERY
JURISDICTION AND VENUE, TO BE IN
MONTAN!\.

It was undispute:i that CINDY L. BACH went to Bozeman,
Montan

ona - Satu rday, driven there by her husband ,

lant JOHN N. BACH.
reached

Appel-

She purchased an Equinox that day and
Per GMAC's

a totally unintegrated agreement

pagenated/recopied version of the Reta1i Installment Sale
Contract, ,parag;-aph
law

apply

to

7 provided : "Federal

this contract.

(CT

1 aw and Montana

7)

Any contract between Ressler Motors and Cindy was
reached in Bozeman, Montana, where such aurchased car was
registered for at least a vear and a half or mnre. If GMAC
wa " the financier it knew tha t CiNDY' s address was:
1 (D No r t ht,

2 7t h St . BI LLI NGS YELLOSJ, 0 NE

MT

59103.

CT

6)

NOTE: Because of the unexpected breakdown of Appellant's
IBM Selectric II. Typewriter Appellant reques~ an additooal
hr e ( ) w ek to 'in~sh +hi~ Opening Brj~f and Replace it
wi t h a f u 1 1 c om p 1e t e OPENI NG BRI EF OTH~R WI\ E, Appe 1 1a nt SUpMI TS
ALL HIS ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES, PAGE\ Pages \ through 29, 1
1
i n s u ppo r t o f al 1 1 h i s i s s ue s s t a t e d he r e i\n
0
/
"
,
/[· .,,,.~
..
1
'

DATED:

August 2, 2011 at approximately//, ]l'1fr
-

30 -

/I

"')oon;t'

L

/

BACH,,

{/_,2;,

[

/

'f'.

CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, certify, that on August 2, 2011,
I did place in separate first class mail envelopes copies of
this APPELLANTS' OPENING RRIEF to:

(1)

Seven (7) bound and

one unbound copy, via ov~rnight mail delivery to;

CLERK,

IDAHO SUPREME COURT, Post Office Box 83720, Boise, Idaho1
83720-0101; and Two (2) copies to Laura Burri, RINGERT LAW

CHARTERED, P.O. Box 2772, Boise, ID 83701-2773.

-

3 l

WHAT IRREF'UTABLE FACTS A.1\J'D IDAHO LAWS OR
STATUTES ALLOWS IT NOW TO SEEK REPOSSESSION
AND RESALS WITHOUT ANY STATED ACCEPTABLE CURRENT':COMMERCIBLE REASONABLE PRACTICES?

Defendant and counterclaimant, recently had priorities of getting ?repared for two

(2) oral appeal arguments

before the Idaho Supreme Court, which have impacted him
adversely from further de
refutations he

n.

neations of his opposition and

He will be filing sup?lemental memoran-

da and affidavits before the hearinq date and time set now
bv the Teton County Seventh Judicial District Court.

Respectfully Submitted, this January 16, 2010.

per.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN~- BACH

I, JOHN N. BACH, also known as JOHN NICHOLAS BACH, Hereby
being placed under oath to testify as stated herein, do so:
1.

I give the testimony herein of my own personal knowledge,

involvements of attendance and presence at the times stated
or events identified, my own personal 9articination as a
former trial attorney and advocate of over 28 vears 1n California, and other neiqhboring states of Nevada, Oreqon and

005G

vJashintgon,

ardin adrrJ±n:t-;ttrative law- tr.:j>bunall?. pe;fpre

Californ:i:a Adn)±nis·t:r;a tive Law· Revi-ew Tribunals and various
in California and personally

Fe.deral Departments: an.d Aqenc
tn Wash±ngt6n, De Cr venues.

2,

I have taught advanced ~us

law courses at California

State Un.jye;t",$::,i:ty, Chico, Cal±f ~, upper division, for both
II

busj.':ness- and accounttn9' majors, with emphas·is on the earlier
Unifo;rm Sales A,ct,' and the Uniform Commercial Codes of Calif.,
and adjo.j::nd.m,g states:, the latter U.C.C. act which is now in
place and apply-i_ng in Idaho~
o~ pl,a_cticer, a_s:- a t:r:r.jl:er,l

Additionally over some 28 years

advocate and ;i:n related administra-

t.i:ye t;t;'ials·,. :,: re9;r:-esented new vehlcles- dealerships, tractor
and f a]:',m i.mplement dea,lershi-ps·, mob;i:.le hoTI!e manufact1:J:r:e1;s ::tadd
reta.r:'.l, ,mo:b:j::le home and trai,lor sales dealershios,
reposS'essions: ~nd the hold;ing of commerc

espcially

lly reasonable resales

fo:r:- purposes· of s:ecurin9 payments- to my- dealerships clients.

l haye handled both appeals, anbltrat±dns and mediations
and resales as required
under the corn:mercial. codes, i:ncldu:i::ng but not limiterl to the
bas;i.c requirements· of fj:-li\ng Form l., signed statements, security
;i:nte.re.s ts in veh±cles, tractors, mob±le hom'fS:, tra± ldrr, motor
b.j.\kes, enow:mob;iles, etc.

Al though never licensed in Idaho to

practice law, I have attempted to and have keot current with
recent decisiDns and st t t
·
au es 1n Idaho, Montana, California and
other states in the field of financed goods purchased.
3.

I personally accomoanied, d

ing Cindy L. Bach, my wife,

to ~essler Motor Co., of Bozeman, .Montan and was" pre· sen t
,JNB's OPP, REFTNS,

& MI'N

ro

ST!fl'ff~7t's --S/J roes

n. 7.

lJet'sonally during the discussions and negotiations conducted
and had on or about January 6, 2007, as I recall a Saturday.
No representattires nor offieers of GM.AC were present nor
took part in such discussions.

Most auspiciously, the offi-

cials of Ressler Motors were agreed that it as the selling
dealershio would finance personally the vehicle to be sold
to Cindy, as one of the owners of aaakson Hole Aviation,
where Cindy was the chief accountant and human resources
director, was a oersonal friend of owner of Ressler, ·and
would guarantee any oayments.

At no

was GMAC to be

a lender nor financer of the vehicle to be purchased by
Cindy, and for this reason

GMAC was never identified nor

stated nor "XX"~d in any box or blanks as
vehicle.

nancinq the

For such reasons, the vehicles was to be reqistered

and licensed in Montana, Bozman, using both Ressler's and
Jacon fHole Aviation's local Bozeman,address or that of their
mutual Bozeman's attorney's address or post o

4.

ce hox.

Attached hereto is a complete, accurate and unaltered

copy of the document signed by Cindy Bach which reveals the
numerous blanks which were neither com?leted nor referenced
in any manner for financing through GMAC
5.

There are many other parts and subjects of the discussions

which I not only overheard but 9articipated re such vehicles,
but at this ju~cture; such are not anorooriate nor to be informally in-jected.
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF Teton

DATED:

January 19, 20101
I, the undersigned NO~ARY PUBLIC
of the State of Idaho, County
do hereby affirm, acknowledqe, attest, verify
and state, that on Satursday, Jan. 1 ·, 2010, in

,et6n61 County, Idaho, JOHN~- BACH did appear,
was made personally known to me, was ola·ced by
me under oath, and after being administered the
oath, he did qive his personal testimony as set
forth in his AFFIDAVIT, SIGNING THE SAME IN 111.Y
PRESENCE AND WITNESS THEREOF, this Januarv )9
2010.
10,

SO SWORN TO AND
2010.
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Notary's address
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(NOTARY SEAL)

CERTIPICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL:
I the undersigned
hereby certifv that on January 1~, 2010, I did nlace
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document with
exhibits attached thereto, in an envelope with first
class postage affixed thereto, addressed to ~lainti
's
counsel, Laua E. Burri,
ngert Law Chartered, P.O. Box
2772, Boise, ID 83701-277.
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RETAIL INSTALMENT SALE CONTRACT
GMAC FLEXIBLE FINANCE PLAN
Dealer Number

Contract Number
Creditor (Seller name and address)

Buyer (and Co-Buyer) Name and address (include county and zip code)

{;H)\' LEE. BAGI

.n

r.:rn 27TH ST

'ESSLER r!OTOR COMP:Uff
lit l1AHI

°.~'- YELLmISTDHE IH 59103

lOZEMA.N Ml 59 71 S-0400

You, the Buyer (and Co-Buyer, 11 any), may buy the vehicle described below for cash or on credit. By signing this contract, you choose to buy the vehicle on ere,
under the agreements on the front and back of this contract. You agree to pay us, the Creditor, the Amount Financed and Finance Charge according to ti
payment schedule shown below. We will figure the Finance Charge on a daily basis.
·

New or Used

EW

Year

Make and Model

VROLET

IHOX

2007

Year

Your trade-in is a:

Vehicle identification No.

Prima

2CNDL23F576064987
Make

Model

FEDERAL TRUTH-IN-LENDING DISCLOSURES
FINANCE
CHARGE
The dollar
amount the
credit will cost
you.

ANNUAL
PE;RCENT AGE
RATE
The cost of your
credit as a yearly
rate.
Q

(Hi

"'

~

t~O':I ")

nn

Amount
financed
The amount of
credit provided to
you or on your
behalf.
,,0 .o!t\ A 7

Use for Which Purchased

D personal, family, or household D agricultural
D business
D

.... ,..

Total of Payments
The amount you
will have paid after
you have made all
payments as

j _,,",, ~~.~ed:.':d.

'" anb uoI::ieUJJO/UI e7 ·sopesn soIn::i)4a11 ap saJopeJdwo::i eJed e)nD
··
·
:uo!le1sueJ1 4s1ueds

Total Sale Price
The total cost of
your purchase on
credit, including
your downpayment

3nnn no

of$
1--- ·- ,__

is

Insurance. You may buy the physical damag
insurance this contract requires (see back) fror
anyone you choose who is acceptable to us. You ar
not required to buy any other insurance to obtai
credit. Your decision to buy or not buy oth;
insurance will not be a factor in the credit approv
process.
If anv insurance is ChAC:kF!rl hAlnw

nnlirioc

O ,
·1uawJ;ed moli 10
0 ()rlJ 01 dn anp siunowe Jn410 11e pue a6m4'.) o,nJeU\:I at.n JO \Jed pr
j

RETAIL INSTALMENT SALE CONTRACT
GMAC FLEXIBLE FINANCE PLAN
Dealer Number

Con1rac1 Number

Credi\ot (Seller name and add1ess)

Buyer (and Co·Buyer}- Name and add 1es$ {include county and zip codej

T: ; [ t
~

:1

~! . ~!

'·i

, / ;; :

_j

!<
H rildr,

j

;,,,:U:MJ :q

'ltLL•~·;,t,:::r 1Jtft ;H _'J'JJO~

You. the Buyer (and Co-Buyer, if any/, may buy the vehicle desc11bed below 1of cash or on credit By signing lnis con1rac1. you choose to buy the veh,cJe on ;::ft:c
under the agreements oo the front and back of th1~ cori1ract You agree lo
us, the Credilor, lhe Amounl Firanced and F nance Charge according 10 lh
paymenl schedule shown below. We will figure lhe Finance Charge on a

Prima Use for Which Putchased
D peisonal, lamily, or household O agricuttural

C business
y e .,

y our tra d1Hn 1s a:

FEOERAl TRUTH-IN·LENOING DISCLOSURES

ANNUAL
PERCENTAGE
RATE
The cost of your

The dollar
amoont the
credit will cost
you

credit as a yearty
rate

,'1

''•l

%

Arrioun1
flnance-d
The amount ol
credit provided lo
you or on your
behaij.

FINANCE
CH.o\RGE

s ;rn ~ nn

Insurance. You may buy lhe physical aaff\age

Total of Paymenl!o

Total S.0:1• Price

T>ie amount you
will have paid atter
you have made all
payments as
scheduled.

The 101a1 co.st of
your purchase on
credit, including
)Ql.Jf downpayment
o!S 'q,-!'' r!C
is

1.;,,:,;,,,n nr,

s'>MHZ 11[1

$ •

·nn

insurance this conlract requires {see back:J ffQfT)
anyone you choose who is acceptable lo us. Yol..i are
not required to buy any other insurance to obtain
credit Your decisioo !O
o, no! buy othec
insurance will not be a lac\or
the credit approval
process.

If any insurarice is checked below, policies o,
cet11f1Cales !tom the named insurance companies will
describe the terms and COf\dihons,

·':ti

Your Payment Schedule Win 9e:

I
I
I

Number
ol Pavments

I of=ts]

,s ;'~···

;,;,

W'len Payments
Are Due

Check the insurance you want and sign below:

I

.~;.:!.

! Mon!hlybeginning,, lf\U mt,

(,n

O

Mooe!

Maire

'i

Optional Credlt Insurance.

l
I

C: Cred,1 Life·

C: Buyer
0Co-8uyer
D Credit Disabillly !Buyer Only)

.

Pr&µayrnenl If you pay oN all your debt earty, you wiU not have 10 pay a penalty.
Seocurlty lnterHt. You are f)iving a secunty inleres!

l'l

!he veh1Cle being purchased.

u 't,
'

Credit Disability $

Additional lnfQf'matlon: See this contraci !or more lnlormatio..'1 including inlormaoon about
nonpayment, defauit, any required repayrnenl in lull before lhe scheduled dale, anti secunty interest

OBoth

-

if,

I

{insurance Company)
I A

ITEMIZ.o\ TION Of AMOUNT flNANCEO

,;,:

P)

-·- s ;·i.t:,, ,r,
~'

[2)

1 Cash pricl:! (1ricluding any accessories, services, and taxes)
2 TolaJ downpayment =- (It ne~!ive en1er

Gross 1:ade•ln S

~;'

!

,I

·o· and see line 4H below}

-payoN byseller s

dlt\

j

(Homa Ottice Address )
Credit hie insurance and credit disability insurance
are nol required lo obtain credit Your dec•sicn 10
buy or not buy :redil life insurance and credit
disabihly insurance will not be a
in t.he credit
approval process. They l'llll no!
provided unless
you sign and agree to pay lhe extra cost Credi! life
insurance pays ooly the :1mount yOtJ would owe 11
you paid a!I your payments on lime. Credit disability
,nsurance does nol co1,er any mcrease ,n your
payrnent or in the 11umber of payrne,.1ts. Coverage
lor credd lite insurance <1nd credil disability
insurance ends on the original due dale for me lasf
paymeni unless a dil!erenJ term for !he insurance 1s
shown below

=- net !r~S·lf1 $
n Lt•
other (descri~L ...

+

casn

$

,nnc

s

+

Pf"
llfj
11 · l j

"•f(

J Unpakl balance of Cash price (i minus 2}

(31

4 Othe, charges i11eludlng a-nounts paid to others on your behalf (Seller may
keep part of these amounts,)·
A Cost of opt!Onal credit insurance paid lo the Insurance
company or companies
U!e
s
I.'.~

s~ · - ~

$
-~isabihty
'J/,1
8 Other Insurance paid to the insurance c;-Of't"lean~

$

}'J:\

C Officfal fees eaid to 2overnment ag_enc;es

$

,.,,.\

0 GovernMent taxes not ·,ncluded in cash Q:rke
E Governmenl license and/or tegist1at10n !(Hits

s

"I A

{iriclude-s:S ,.,

securi!)i: tnteresl recording; lee)

s

., ;_,,

d' ·,
Type of Insurance
Premium S

s _ .....!i.J.Jt-.__
F Go1ternrnent certificate of tltte fees

___

Otner lnsuranc•,

---

i

,.,.,

'} I

I'

Term

~

(lnsurance Company}

G O!h~r chaige-s {Se!le1 mus! tdenlity who is paid and

descri~_purpos(t.)

torn

'"'t!
to ,
~PO-'.G!~

'll>f:l:
°'

to '

fop'

.-,nn

s,

\Home Otfice Address)

P:

$

I want the insurance checked above.

;11:

;

s

X

''

.,n

Buyer Signalure

,n

to,"

fo,,

s
s

Jo,\

/or

$~

"

H ~ Qillc'.Qff~ ~
.
S
T olal other charg:es and arnounls oald to others on i'.our behalf

Co,Suyer Signalure

··-

+

41

S,

"'
__,i,,;,<,:::
f;r,.

14)

j5l

HOW THIS CONTRACT CAN BE CHANGED, nus con1rac! contains lt\e enlire agreement between
contract must be in wntmg and we must s19r ii No oral changes are binding
~erS~sX

Da1e

ANY INSURANCE REFERRED TO IN THIS

-----.1!+"---=

5 Amounl finaricea (3

Date

X

n

CONTRACT ODES NOT INCLUDE COVERAGE
FOR BOOllY INJURY ANO PROPERTY
DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS.

r0u

and us relaflrlg lo 1h1s contract Any change :o '.he

- - - - ~ - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - ( 2 J : _ ~ u y e r Sig,_n..csc..Xc___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

H a'ly part ol trus con1racl is no! valid, aH other pans stay valid We may delay or refram !,om enforcing any ot our 11ghts under ih;s conlrnt::t w1tt.ovt losmg \~~rt1
Fo, example, we may ex1end the trne !cw making some paymenis wi!houl extending the t•me for making ottie11,

Su back for other imporlllt'II agreements.

1. Notice to lhe buyer. Do not sign lhla contract before you read it or if It contains any blank spaces,
2. You are enUtled to an exact copy of the contract you sign,
3. Under the law, yo<; have the right to pay off In advance the full amo<;nt due and lo obtain a partial refund of the
finance charge.
Tiu• Annual Percentage Rate may btJ negotiable with the Seller, The Seller may assign this contract and retain its right
10 receive a part of the Finance Charge.

You agree to the terms of this contract. You confirm that before you signed this contract, we gave it to you, and you
were free to take it and review II. .You confirm that you received a completely filled-in copy when you signed it.

Dat~.I'.lfiL'..UJll__._

Buyer Signs :(

Co--8uyer11 11nd Other Ownets - A CO·bvyer ,s a person who •s resPons1bie tor paying
~wnet 1s a pe:son
lr'le vi,hide but does no! have lo pay the debt The other owner agrtes to !he s-ecunty 111;ere.st in l~e ve>i1c1e given 10 us 1n th1s con1rac1

~~·~·---,- -----···

2109 f-R MT 1012006 (Fo1 use

111

t~e State of Moniana)

Cc-pyrighl 2006 GMAC, AH H19h1s Reserved

l ul 4)

Notice: See Other Side

OUAOPUPUGATE (,RIGIHAL · 'JM.£.C FILE COPY

I

OTHER IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS
1. FINANCE CHARGE AND PAYMENTS
a, How we wlll figure Finance Charge. The Finance Charge 1s figured
on a dally basis at the Annual Percentage Rare on !he unpaid par1 of
the Amount Financed.
b. How we will apply payments. We w,11 apply each paymenl f1~! lo the
earned and unpaK:I part of the Finance Charge, and then 10 the unpaid
pa.rt al the Amount Financed.

c. How late payment• or early payments change whal you must pay.
We based \he Finance Charge, Total of Paymen1s, and Total Sale
Price shown on !he Iron! on the assumprton that you will make every
paymenr on the day it Is due Your Finance Charge. Total at Payments,
and Total Sale Pnce will be more it you pay lale and less 1f you pay
early Chan9es may take the form of a larger or smaller l1nal paymenl
or, al our optJon, more or fewer payments of lhe same amount as your
scheduled payment with a smaller rinal payment. We w,11 send you a
nolice lelhng you about these changes before !he final scheduled
payment LS due.

2. YOUR OTHER PROMISES TO US
a, If lhe vehicle is damaged, destroyed, or missing. You agree to pay
us all you owe under this contract even 11 the veh!de 1s damaged,
destroyed, or missing.
b. Using !he vehicle. You agree no! lo remove the vehicle lrom lhe U.S.
or Canada, or to sell, rent, lease, or transfer any rnleresl 1n the vehicle
or this contracl w1lh0UI our written perm1ssf0n. You agree nol to expose
the vehicle lo misuse, seizure, confiscation, or involuntary transfer. rr
we pay any repair bills, storage bills, taxes, lines. or charges on the
vehicle, you agree 10 repay the amount when we aslil for it.
c. Security interest You give us a secur,ty 1nteres1 tn:
1. The vehicle and all parts or goods installed in 11;
2. All money or goods received (proceeds) lor the vehicle;
3 AU insurance, maintenance, service, or olher conlracts we finance
for you; and
4. All proceeds rrom insurance, rnamlenance, service. or olher
contracts we finance for you. Thrs includes any refunds al
premiums or charges lrom the contracts.
This secures payment of all you owe on lhis con1rac1 II also secures
your other agreements in Lh1s contract. You w1I/ make sure !he title
sl1ows our security inlerest (hen) in lhe vehicle.
d. Insurance you must have on the vehlcle. You agree lo have physical
damage insurance covering ICJss or damage fa the veh1ele for the term
al this conlract. The insurancG musl cover our interest in the vehicle. If
you do no\ have this insurance, we may, ir we decide, buy physical
damage insurance, If we dedde to buy physical damage insurance, we
may either buy insurance 1hat covers your inleresl and our 1nleres1 ·1n
the vehicle, or buy insurance lhal cavers only our inleresl. 1r we buy
e11her type of insurance. we will tell you which 1ype and the charge you
must pay. The charge will be the premium for the insurance and a
finance charge at the highest rale the law permrts.

!I the vehicle 1s lost or damaged, you agree thal we may use any
insurance settlement to reduce what you owe or repair the vehicle.
e. Whal happens to returned insurance, maintenance, service, or
other contract chargea. If we gel a refund al insurance, mainlenance,
service, or other contract charges, you agree thal we may sublract the
refund lrom what you owe.

3. YOU MAY PREPAY
You may prepay all or part al 1he unpaid part al the Amounl Financed a1
any time without penalty. II you do .'iO, you must pay !he earned and
unpaid par! ol the Finance Charge and an other amounts due up lo the
dale of your payment.

b. You may have to pay all you owe al once. If you break your
promises (default), we may demand tha1 you pay all you owe on 1h1s
contract at once. Defaul1 means:
1. You do not pay any payment on lime;
2 You slar1 a proceeding in bankruptcy or one 1s slaned against you
or your proper1y; or
3. You break any a9reements in !his contract.
The amount tOU w~I owe w1U be the unpaid part o1 the Amounl
Financed plus the earned and unpaid part of the Finance Charge arrd
any amounts due because you defauJled,
c. Yoo may have lo pay collecllon costs. Ir we hire an attorney who 1s
nol our salaned employee lo collect whal tOU owe, you w,11 pay the
attorney's reasonable lee and court costs the law permits. The
maximum attorney's lee you will pay will be 15% ol lhe amount you
owe.
d. we may take the vehlcle from you. II you default we may takE
(repossess) !he vehicle trom you 11 we do so peacelu41y and the la~
allows it. II your vehicle has an electrOl"IIC tracking device, you agree
that we mar use the device to find the vehicf.e, II we take the vehicle
any accessones, equtpmenl, and replacement parts W'III stay Wlth thi
vehicte. II any personal 1lems are in the vehicle, we may store them lo
you al your expense. If you do not ask for lhese items back., we rna
dispose of them as the law allows.
e. How you can get lhe vehlcle bacl( if we lake It. II we repossess thf
vehicle, you may pay to ge1 11 back (redeem}. We w1/l !eU you how mud
lo pay to redeem. Your nght 10 redeem ends when we sell lhe vehicle.
We will sell the vehicle if you do not gel II back. If you do no
redeem, we will sell the vehicle, We wilt send you e wntten notice o
sale belore selltng the vehk:le.
We will apply the money !rorn lhe sale, less allowed e)l(penses, 10 tht
amount you owe. Allowed expenses are expenses we pay as a direc
result ol taking the vehicle, hcid1ng ii, preparing ii !or sale, and selling 11
Allorney fees and cour1 cos1s the law perrmts are also aillo""e(
expenses. II any money 1s let1 (surplus). we will pay il to you. If mane~
lrom the sale is not enough lo pay the amount you owe, you must pa•
the rest lo us. It you do not pay this amount when we ask, we ma•
charge you rnleresl al lhe highest lawful rate untll you pay.
g. Whal we may do about optional insurance, maintenance, ser,iice
o, other ,;ontracts. This contract may contain charges 10< cpl.Jona
insurance, maintenance, service, or other contracts. If we reposses
the vehicle, we may claim benehts under lhese con1,acts and canu
them 10 obtain refunds of unearned charges to reduce whal you owe a
repair the vehicle. II fhe vehtcle 1s a total loss because ii is confiscated
dainaged, or stolen, we may cla11n benelits under these conlracts a~
cancel them 10 obtain refunds_ of unearned charges lo reduce what yo1
owe.

5. WARRANTIES SELLER DISCLAIMS
Unless the Seller mal(es a written warranty, or enters Into a service
contra,;t within 9-0 daya from the date of 1h19 contract, the Seller
mal(ea no warrantiss, express or implied, on Iha vehlcle, and there
wlll be no Implied warranties of merchantability or of fitnese for a
particular purposa.
This prov1s,oo does not affect any warranties covering the vehicle thal the
vehicle manufacturer may provide.

6. Used Car Buyers Gulde. The Information you see on the window forr,
for thia vehicle Is part of this contract. Information on the- wlndov
form overrides any contrary provieiona In the contract of sale.
Spanish Translatlon:
Guia para compradores de vahlculos usados. La informaciOn que v1

SUPt?LEM:i;:NTAL CERTIPICA'I'~ O:r;'
S!':-qvrcE BY r1AIL
I, the undersiqned here~v suonlement and further
certifv service uoon oonosinq counsel, this January 19,
2010, necessitated hecause of the absence of a Notarv Public
on Saturdav, Jan. 16, 2010 in the business area of -qexburq,
~ain Street, due to the Martin Luther King extended holidav,
and the obtaininq of a Notarv ?ublic's signature and Seal,
this Date, Tuesday, ,Tanuary 19, 2011) in Teton County, from
which Driqq's ~ain nost nffice I did mail a comolete coov of
the foregoinq document of now 10 paqes in a se~arate envelooe
with attachments thereto, with fi s~ class nostaqe affixed,
addressed to:
Laua E. Burri, Rin er\Law Charter, ?.O. Box
2772, Boise, Idaho 83701-2772.
DATSD: January 19, 2110·

/!w

/}!

\~/\"'-- -.._/,)

1//

(}"-v

~

(

STATE OF IDAHO )

Coooly ol Teton ) ss.
I HEREBY CERTIFY !hat the above and
'°'8golrig II a ful, true and OOffllCt copy of
lhe ot1glnel theteof, ~ tile In my office.
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